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Abstract
A long line of research investigates whether the retail prices of electricity and natural gas
send proper signals about scarcity in order to induce efficient consumption. Historically,
regulated utilities have not designed tariffs that set marginal prices equal to marginal costs.
Currently, some jurisdictions are opening the retail sectors to competition via “retail choice.”
These new regimes replace imperfect regulation with imperfect competition as the process
by which retail tariffs are formed. We discuss the challenges in evaluating the efficiency of
tariffs and present evidence of how pricing has changed in markets with retail choice.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have investigated the efficiency of retail pricing in the electricity and natural
gas industries for decades. Historically, the challenge has been to set prices in a manner that
ensures a regulated utility covers its investment and production costs while simultaneously
providing consumers with optimal incentives to consume. A common theoretical solution is
to use a two-part tariff that includes a fixed component along with a marginal usage price
set equal to the marginal cost of provision. In practice, tariffs set via a regulatory process
often deviate from theoretical prescriptions for optimal two-part tariffs.
Although some jurisdictions continue to follow this regulated utility model, others are
opening retail electricity and natural gas sectors to competition via “retail choice.” Many
areas in the U.S. and UK, for example, allow end-users including residential customers to
choose their retail provider. In these jurisdictions, the form of tariff functions by entrant
retailers is not an outcome of a regulatory process. Rather, these tariffs arise from the strate-
gic interaction of firms that compete for customers, albeit in markets that are unlikely to
be perfectly competitive. Thus, these new retail choice regimes replace imperfect regulation
with imperfect competition as the process that creates retail tariffs.
In this article, we discuss the challenges in evaluating the efficiency of tariffs and present
evidence that prices continue to diverge from marginal cost after retail choice is introduced.
2 The Pricing Problem in Retail Electricity and Nat-
ural Gas
A regulated utility’s pricing challenge is the well-known natural monopoly pricing problem.
Transmission and distribution (T&D) in the electricity industry have natural monopoly
characteristics: high fixed costs make it very inefficient to build redundant sets of long-
distance transmission lines or local distribution infrastructure. Similarly, retail distribution
in the natural gas industry is characterized by high fixed costs and low variable costs. To
recover these investment costs, the T&D components must be “priced into” retail charges
for electricity and natural gas.
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The electricity industry faces another dimension along which costs need to be incorporated
into pricing—the timing of consumption. Although some natural gas can be stored in the
distribution system, electricity cannot be efficiently stored on a large scale, which requires
balancing production and consumption at every moment in time. Because demand follows
pronounced daily patterns, the variable cost of production is often substantially higher during
peak as compared to off-peak periods. Retail prices could vary as frequently as every ten
minutes to reflect the localized marginal cost of production, but there is currently little
take-up of dynamic pricing schemes for residential customers. Joskow and Wolfram (2012)
discuss some of the current challenges in dynamically pricing electricity.
Throughout most of the U.S. experience, the distribution sector of the natural gas industry
and all sectors of the electricity industry have been regulated utilities. For the natural gas
industry, a common theoretical prescription is to use a two-part tariff where the marginal
price of the tariff function is set equal to marginal cost.
Because power is not storable in the electricity sector, the efficiency properties of pricing
schemes are more nuanced. Joskow and Tirole (2006) provide a detailed theoretical analysis
of the efficiency of pricing under both monopoly provision and retail competition. First-best
solutions are generally achievable only if retail customers have their consumption metered
on a real-time basis and face retail prices reflecting real-time wholesale scarcity. In the
absence of real-time pricing, inefficiencies arise. Customers who pay a variable usage price
that does not adjust to match system grid conditions will over-consume during peak periods
and under-consume off-peak. Moreover, Joskow and Tirole show that retail competition only
exacerbates this inefficiency.
Finally, jurisdictions with retail choice face another source of inefficiency in imperfect
competition. Studies of residential markets with retail choice suggest that there is consid-
erable consumer inertia to remain with the incumbent (e.g. Giulietti et al., 2005; Hortac¸su
et al., 2012).
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3 Challenges in Defining Benchmarks for Retail En-
ergy Price Efficiency
Despite fairly clear normative theoretical prescriptions, constructing a benchmark for opti-
mal pricing is not straightforward in practice. We discuss two important complications in
evaluating whether tariffs provide optimal consumption signals.
First, utilities lack adequate incentives to fully incorporate external costs into their
marginal price. Production and consumption in the natural gas and electricity industries
generate emission costs, and these are often not fully internalized.
Second, utility customers may not respond to the marginal price of gas or electricity in
the manner implied by standard theory. Electric and gas utilities typically charge non-linear
tariffs that include a fixed “customer charge” along with variable usage charges, which often
take the form of increasing block tariffs.
Suppose that customers respond to larger utility bills by consuming less energy, ce-
teris paribus. This observed behavior is consistent with consumers responding to either the
marginal price (i.e. the slope of the non-linear tariff) or to their average price (e.g. the aver-
age ¢/kWh that is reported on many bills). Either behavioral response is possible depending
on consumer knowledge of the tariff function and the type of information that is saliently
reported on bills. Utility bills often do a poor job of clearly displaying the marginal price
of each additional unit of energy. It is common for utility bills to display some breakdown
of total expenditures, but bills (that we observe) often do not saliently display the marginal
price schedule. Casual empiricism suggests that utility customers are better informed about
their total monthly expenditures on gas/electricity rather than the marginal price; contrast
this with drivers who are likely better informed about the (marginal) price per gallon than
their total monthly expenditures on gasoline.
In general, average prices may be above or below marginal prices depending on the
size of the fixed charge and the extent to which increasing block tariffs are utilized. Thus,
consumers responding to the average price rather than the marginal price may either over
or under-consume relative to the theoretically optimal level of consumption. Ito (2012)
tests how consumers respond to nonlinear tariffs by using a spatial discontinuity research
design, which exploits variation across two contiguous electric utilities that use different
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tariff functions. His results indicate that consumers respond to changes in average prices
rather than to marginal prices. This line of research suggests that if academics are to make
policy recommendations based upon “getting the marginal price right,” then we also should
advocate for bill design that saliently displays that price signal.
Because it is unclear to which price signals consumers respond, our analysis below com-
pares the marginal cost of provision to both marginal and average prices.
4 Retail Competition and the Efficiency of Pricing in
the U.S.
During the last decade, the number of retail customers purchasing energy services from a
firm other than a regulated utility increased substantially. Several states opened retail mar-
kets in which new entrants procure wholesale power and gas and market it to commercial,
industrial, and residential customers. In the analysis below, we consider one of these in-
dustry sectors—residential electricity—and study how tariffs change when retail choice is
introduced. Although the complications discussed in section 3 preclude fully evaluating the
efficiency of observed tariffs, we assess whether features of regulated tariffs that are thought
to generate inefficiency persist under retail competition.
In particular, we investigate whether monthly tariffs to residential customers send accurate
signals about the marginal cost of power. It is important to keep in mind that this is testing
for second-best pricing. Dynamic prices are necessary to achieve the first-best solution,
but it appears unlikely in the near-term that many residential customers will face real-time
tariffs. Therefore, it is valuable to investigate how closely monthly tariffs reflect the marginal
cost of power (averaged over the hours of the month) and generate proper (second-best)
consumption signals. We discuss initial evidence using data from Texas, the state that ranks
highest in electricity consumption and has a high rate of participation in retail electricity
choice programs.
It is a priori ambiguous whether transitioning to competition improves the efficiency of
pricing—tariffs with the inefficiencies generated by the regulatory process are replaced by
those arising from imperfectly competitive retail markets.
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The regulatory process is known to generate multi-part tariffs in which the marginal price
diverges from marginal cost. Fixed distribution costs are priced into the usage component of
tariffs rather than solely into the fixed customer charge. For the case of natural gas, Davis
and Muehlegger (2010) find that residential and commercial customers face retail prices that
are more than 40% above marginal cost. Additionally, state public utility commissions of-
ten establish increasing block rates so that higher usage consumers pay a higher price on
the margin. These increasing block tariffs are poorly conceived from an efficiency perspec-
tive. One motivation for higher marginal prices is to encourage conservation; however, the
marginal social cost of one more unit of consumption is not any higher for an individual con-
sumer’s 499th kilowatt-hour than the consumer’s 500th kWh. Equity concerns often serve as
another motivation, but Borenstein and Davis (2010) find only a weak correlation of natural
gas consumption with income.
Under a retail choice regime, other factors determine tariff design. Joskow and Tirole
show that a perfectly competitive retail market would not involve increasing block tariffs:
customers would be charged the same marginal price for all units of consumption. However,
in an imperfectly competitive market in which consumers exhibit inertial preference for the
incumbent, tariffs set by the incumbent firm—perhaps via regulatory mandate—will impact
the tariff functions chosen by competitive retailers.
5 Empirical Analysis of Tariffs Under Retail Competi-
tion
We present evidence on how electricity tariffs change when retail competition was introduced
in Texas in January 2002. Areas of the state served by investor-owned utilities were required
to allow entry of competitive retailers. Incumbent retailers charged a regulated tariff called
the price-to-beat, and entrants were allowed to choose any tariff functions. Areas served by
municipal utilities opted out of retail choice.
We examine tariffs of two regulated incumbents, competitive entrants into the deregulated
markets, and a “control” composed of two large municipal utilities that remained regulated
throughout the entire time period. We view the control municipal utilities not as counter-
factuals for the incumbents but rather as comparison utilities that face similar demand and
cost shocks.
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Our analysis investigates two characteristics of tariff functions: (1) do marginal and/or
average prices reflect marginal costs, and (2) do firms use increasing/decreasing block or
single-block tariffs?
5.1 Data
We collected data on the residential tariff functions for the two largest territories that were
opened to retail competition and the two largest municipal utilities that remained regulated
for a period spanning the introduction of retail choice in 2002. Specifically, we include the
monthly residential tariffs from January 1997 to July 2006 for TXU (which we refer to as
“Dallas area”) and Reliant (“Houston area”) to analyze areas opened to competition. We also
use tariffs for City Public Service of San Antonio and Austin Energy, which were regulated
for the entire period. Data on regulated tariffs are gathered from each utility. Tariffs from
the retail choice regime were provided by the Public Utility Commission of Texas.
The marginal cost of delivering an additional kWh of retail power is estimated with the
average monthly wholesale price of power in Texas. We calculate the load-weighted average
monthly wholesale price of electricity in Texas using daily wholesale prices from Megawatt
Daily for the region of ERCOT that matches each territory.
The information on tariffs and wholesale prices allow us to measure the monthly difference
between the actual marginal retail price and realized marginal energy costs for any usage
level in each territory. In order to determine representative usage levels, we use a sample
of nineteen thousand individual customers’ monthly meter-reads to create a distribution of
consumption levels.
5.2 Do Tariffs Send Correct Price Signals?
Figure 1 displays the differences between marginal price and marginal costs before and after
retail deregulation in 2002. In order to create these figures, we calculate markups evaluated
at each usage level from the distribution of consumption for each provider-month. From
these, we compute the simple average markup.
Panel (a) shows markups in the Houston area. The “Control utilities” series is the
(territory size weighted) average retail markup across the two areas that never allowed retail
choice; the average markup was 5.10¢/kWh prior to 2002 and 4.11¢/kWh after 2002.
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The other three series are informative about changes associated with retail choice. The
“Treated incumbent” was required to charge the regulated price-to-beat, so the incumbent’s
pricing does not represent the outcome of retail choice, but rather is a driver of market
forces under retail choice. For the Houston incumbent, the average margin was 6.46¢/kWh
prior to 2002 and 6.50¢/kWh after 2002. The series “Large entrant” shows that a major new
entrant priced only slightly below the price-to-beat (5.67¢/kWh average markup). The series
“Low-cost entrant” plots the weighted-average retail price margin (3.87¢/kWh on average)
for the set of entrant firms yielding the lowest total bill for each consumption level. Panel
(b) shows markups in the Dallas area, and we find markups that are somewhat smaller than
in Houston but still around 5¢/kWh on average.
Because consumers might respond to average prices rather than marginal prices, we sep-
arately calculate differences between average price and marginal cost. Figures depicting the
resulting margins (available in the Online Appendix) exhibit similar patterns, with differ-
ences that are slightly larger than those shown in Figure 1.
This analysis shows that marginal and average retail prices diverge from marginal cost
both before and after retail deregulation. If consumers respond to either of these two features
of tariffs, then there will be a quantity distortion relative to price signals that reflect the
wholesale cost of power. In this article, we do not attempt to assess the welfare consequences
of this pricing; such a calculation requires information on external costs and the demand
function. However, our analysis does suggest that a quantity distortion relative to the
marginal cost of production continues to persist after retail competition was introduced in
Texas.
5.3 Do Tariffs Utilize Single Block Pricing?
We also explore the extent to which increasing block tariffs continue to be used under a
retail choice regime. As we discuss above, tiered pricing schemes are inconsistent with
marginal cost pricing (either social or private), and often are motivated by distributional
or conservation goals. Moreover, retail competition should undermine the ability to charge
multi-block tariffs.
However, evidence from the first years of the Texas retail market suggests that tiered
pricing continues under retail choice. For each month and provider, we compute the marginal
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price across a distribution of usage levels and then calculate the standard deviation of these
marginal prices. If a provider levies only a single block tariff for a given month, then all
customers pay the same marginal price and the standard deviation is zero. However, if the
provider uses an increasing (or decreasing) block tariff, then customers pay different marginal
prices and the standard deviation of these prices will be positive. The magnitude depends
upon the size of price difference between the tiers and the frequency with which customers
consume on the different tiers.
Figure 2 plots the monthly standard deviation for several providers before and after
retail choice is introduced in 2002. In Panel (a) for the Houston area, the series for the
“Treated incumbent” reflects that fact that the regulated price-to-beat included increasing
block pricing, and this yields similar levels of variation in marginal prices as prior to deregu-
lation. The “Large entrant” series indicates that this retailer entered the market with single
block tariffs for the first year but then switched to an increasing block tariff yielding similar
levels of variation in marginal prices as the price-to-beat. The series “Low-cost entrant”
exhibits slightly less dispersion, but nevertheless reflects using tiered pricing that generates
substantial dispersion in effective marginal prices.
In Panel (b) for the Dallas area, there is generally less variation in marginal prices than
in Houston, especially in the summer when the Incumbent and Large entrant (but not the
Low-cost entrant) utilize single block tariffs. However, all firms use multi-block tariffs in the
winter that generate dispersion in marginal price.
Finally, let us comment on external validity. The changes in tariffs from introducing retail
competition can vary substantially across jurisdictions depending on how the transition to
competition is regulated. States have taken different approaches to set the rate charged
by the incumbent firm, which in a market with consumer inertia can have a large impact
on pricing by new entrant retailers. In Texas, the public utility commission regulated the
incumbent’s rate at a level that was thought to be above competitive levels with the goal of
encouraging entry by other retailers. States that follow different transition strategies could
experience different changes in the shape, level, and distribution of tariff functions.
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6 Discussion
The introduction of retail competition in electricity and natural gas markets is generating
important new areas of research on retail pricing. Economists have focused attention on the
marginal price as the relevant signal of scarcity. The extent to which consumers respond
to this signal depends upon the saliency of tariff information. In new retail markets, bills
are designed by firms who compete for customers rather than by regulatory commissions.
In settings with retail choice, it will be interesting to observe which types of information on
price and usage are saliently displayed on bills.
Finally, research should continue to explore the competitiveness of these new retail mar-
kets and the inertia surrounding incumbent firms. Ultimately, the welfare implications for
retail choice will depend upon the competitiveness of the retail markets, the nature of the
tariff functions, and the information about those tariff functions that is saliently conveyed
to customers.
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Figure 1: Retail marginal price minus marginal cost: pre- and post-deregulation
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Figure 2: Standard deviation of marginal price across consumers: pre- and post-deregulation
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